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Startup firms face a significant managerial challenge when they grow beyond the 
boundaries of informal interactions. This transition point has often been identified with a 
significant crisis in the growth path of these firms. An important aspect of this transition is 
the adoption of management control systems that leverage top management attention and 
provide the infrastructure to scale up the business model. Using a multi-method, multi-case 
field research design in a sample of 78 startup firms, we examine the relevance of the 
adoption of financial systems vis-à-vis other management control systems. We find that 
financial planning—including cash budget, operating budget and sales projections—are the 
earliest set of systems adopted. We also look at the association between the adoption of 
management control systems and startup firm growth. We model this association using a 
simultaneous equation specification to capture the theoretical arguments that posit the 
endogeneity of these variables. We find a positive and significant association in both 
equations among these variables. We further examine whether the often argued CEO 
replacement at this transition point is associated with the level of adoption of management 
control systems. We find that CEOs that have adopted fewer systems have shorter tenures. 
Taking advantage of the intimate knowledge that venture capital investors have about the 
management processes (and management systems in particular) of the firms they invest in, 
we examine the association between company valuation and the adoption of management 
control systems. We find evidence consistent with this association. Finally, we examine the 
association between the adoption of financial planning systems and the adoption of strategic 
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1.  Introduction 
 
An important stage in the growth of startup firms is the transition from an informal 
management style to the need for professional management tools (Baron, Burton, & 
Hannan, 1999; Hellmann & Puri, 2002). This transition point traditionally has been 
associated with the first growth crisis (Greiner, 1972, 1998). Failure to properly manage this 
crisis has been associated with constrained growth and even firm liquidation. The 
entrepreneurship literature has also documented a common association between this 
transition point and the replacement of the original CEO (Willard & Krueger, 1992). The 
proposed explanation for this empirical regularity is that the psychological characteristics of 
entrepreneurs are such that while they enjoy the fluidity of new ventures, they dislike the 




Management control systems—defined as “formal, information-based routines and 
procedures managers use to maintain or alter patterns in organizational activities” (Simons, 
1995) (page 5)—are important tools for professionalizing a company. They help managers 
leverage their attention, liberating it from decisions that can be delegated and controlled by 
exception and supplying information when the informal network is overloaded. 
Management control systems are interpreted as a subset of organizational routines (Nelson 
& Winter, 1982; Zollo & Winter, 2002) characterized by being recurrent, formalized, and 
information-based. 
 
The study of management control systems has focused on cross-sectional variation 
in large established firms (Cardinal, 2001; Chenhall, 2003); it is only recently that empirical 
evidence on their emergence in startup firms has started to accumulate (Dávila, 2005; 
Sandino, 2005). These studies have examined factors associated with cross-sectional 
variation in the time-to-adoption of particular management control systems and how this 
timing varies with the strategy of startups. However, they only look at a subset of these 
systems. More importantly, they do not address a fundamental question implicit in models 
                                                 
* This paper was funded by the Center for Entrepreneurial Studies (CES), Graduate School of Business, 
Stanford University. We greatly appreciate the support of CES co-directors Professors Irv Grousbeck, Charles 
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grateful for the support of the people that assisted us on this project—Jakub Wilsz, Jennifer van Steele, Aimee 
Noelle Swanson, Christopher Armstrong, Jan Chong, Merle Ederhof, and Ravi Sarin. 
1 The phenomenon, which is driven by small organizations outgrowing informal management processes, may 




of startup firm growth: the relevance of management control systems to the ability to deal 
successfully with this first growth crisis and, consequently, to organization performance. 
 
We examine the evolution of 78 startup companies from their founding. We 
analyze how these firms build up their management control systems in eight different areas: 
financial planning, human resource planning, strategic planning, financial evaluation, 
human resource evaluation, product development, sales, and partnerships; and how this 
process is integrated within the broader process of growth. We address three research 
questions. The first one compares the rate of adoption of financial planning and evaluation 
systems against other types of management control systems. The second question examines 
the relationship between the adoption of various management control systems and three 
different variables associated with growth—number of employees, CEO rotation, and 
company valuation. The third one looks at how the adoption of financial planning systems is 
related to the timing of adoption of strategic and human resource planning systems. 
 
We collect field research data using a multi-method, multi-case research design. 
The proprietary nature of the data and the detail needed to address the research questions 
demanded the design of tailored data collection instruments. For each company in our 
sample, we triangulate information from public sources, three questionnaires to three 
different managers, and three semi-structured interviews with those managers. 
 
This paper contributes to the literature in two distinct ways. First, we provide 
empirical evidence on the simultaneous association between the evolution of management 
control systems and firm size measured by number of employees. This finding is consistent 
with firm growth requiring the management infrastructure that these systems provide as well 
as these systems being a consequence of growth. We further probe a common argument put 
forward to explain the founder’s replacement as CEO; in particular, we document an 
association between the level of management control system adoption and the likelihood of 
CEO turnover. CEOs that adopt fewer systems are replaced sooner; this is consistent with 
certain founders having difficulties in moving from an entrepreneurial to a managerial 
role—as measured by the level of adoption of a set of managerial tools—and being 
replaced. We also document an association between the level of management control system 
adoption and company valuation. This result takes advantage of venture capitalists’ broad 
understanding of management practices, which allows them to price their quality. Our 
second contribution documents how the adoption decisions for different types of 
management control systems complement or supplement each other. In particular, we 
examine this relationship for the three types of planning systems: human resource planning, 
strategic planning, and financial planning. We find that the adoption of human resource 
planning and the adoption of strategic planning complement each other—a firm’s having 
adopted one of them is associated with faster time to adoption of the other. In contrast, the 
fact of having adopted financial planning is associated with longer time to adoption of 
human resource planning and strategic planning.  
 
 
2.  Management control systems and startup growth 
 
Two lines of research are relevant to the relationship between management control 
systems and startup growth. One of them examines a sub-set of management control 
systems in startup firms. The second one looks at the determinants of growth in this type of 
firms. 
 
Management control systems have been said to facilitate growth. They are adopted 
to overcome the limitations of informal management styles that require constant personal 




processing perspectives, which are the main roles of management accounting systems (and, 
more broadly, management control systems) (Baiman, 1982; Narayanan and Dávila, 1998). 
As firms grow, direct observation of the agents’ effort—the main control approach in the 
absence of systems—becomes too costly, and motivation and monitoring have to be 
achieved through the design of appropriate management control systems such as 
compensation systems, standard operating procedures, or performance measurement 
systems. Firm growth also affects a firm’s ability to move information to the right decision 
makers. Without formal systems, the number of interactions required to move information 
around the firm increases exponentially with the number of employees. The cost of 
communication becomes excessive if management control systems are not implemented. 
 
Baron, Burton and Hannan (1996, 1999) examine the adoption of human resource 
management systems in startup firms. Their objective is to understand the impact of the 
founder’s mental model of human resource relationships on the speed of adoption of these 
systems. They do not attempt to associate them with company size, although this latter 
variable is included as an independent control. Size is significant in explaining speed of 
adoption in 17 out of 25 HR policies, and in explaining the number of systems adopted at 
the end of the first year. Hellman and Puri (2002) find that venture-backed firms are faster at 
adopting HR policies and stock-option compensation plans. 
 
Moores and Yuen (2001) map the type of management accounting systems in place 
throughout the lifecycle of firms. In particular, they identify the transition from birth to 
growth as the point at which these systems are formalized. Sandino (2005) studies the 
adoption of management accounting systems in a sample of 97 young U.S. retailers. She 
finds that all these firms adopt a basic set of managerial accounting systems, including 
budgets, pricing systems and inventory control. But they differ in the adoption of more 
advanced systems: firms following a cost strategy add managerial tools focused on 
enhancing efficiencies, while firms following a differentiation strategy adopt tools to gather 
customer information. In a companion paper, Dávila and Foster (2005) examine the 
adoption of management accounting systems and of budgets in particular. They find that 
size, the presence of venture funding, CEO experience and how the CEO interprets 
management accounting systems are associated with faster adoption of operating budgets. 
They further find an association between the adoption of operating budgets and firm growth.  
 
Another research thrust has devoted its efforts to understanding what differentiates 
high-growth startups. Most of this research is based on empirical observation and has 
evolved around three main themes: management characteristics, competitive strategy, and 
competitive environment. For instance, Roure and Keeley (1990) identify the completeness 
of the founding team, technical superiority, product development time, and buyer 
concentration as associated with value creation in venture-backed startups. Feeser and 
Willard (1990) identify success with top management’s “sensitivity to opportunity.” 
Similarly, Siegel, Siegel and Macmillan (1993) identify management’s industry experience 
and their ability to stay focused as separating high and low growth young firms. Evidence 
on the potential role of management control systems is sparse but in the expected direction. 
Reid and Smith (2000) use a sample of 150 small and medium Scottish firms to examine 
variables associated with performance (measured as a combination of employee growth, 
profitability and productivity). Their ordered logit specification (they group the firms into 
three performance groups) includes 20 variables capturing different aspects of the 
management team and organization. They find that management characteristics are non-
significant or have a negative impact on performance except for “pursuit of high return on 
investment”; however, “forward planning” and “organization and systems” have a positive 
effect. Barringer, Jones, and Neubaum (2005) content-analyze the narrative case studies for 
50 high-growth and 50 slow-growth firms. Based on an extensive literature review, they 




vision, planning, commitment to growth, etc.), business practices (such as product 
superiority, innovation, etc.), and HR practices. They conclude that high-growth firms have 
founders with more experience, better education, and higher motivation; have stronger 
commitment to growth and alliances; have deeper customer understanding; and emphasize 
training, employee development and financial incentives. 
 
A third research stream relevant to this paper is summarized in the following quote: 
“[founders] are probably unsuited to be managers” (Greiner, 1998) (page 61). The 
assumption is that the founder “needs and values creative expression and is easily bored by 
familiar territory” (Rubenson and Gupta, 1996) (page 25). However, evidence consistent 
with this assumption is only starting to emerge. Willard and Krueger (1992) do not find 
support for founders underperforming compared to non-founding CEOs. Fiet et al. (1997) 
relate the likelihood of top management dismissal with sales underperformance, smaller 
boards, and the presence of venture capitalists on the board. Hellman and Puri (2002) find 
that venture capitalists are faster at replacing the CEO with an outsider. Wasserman (2003) 
also finds that founder turnover is associated with venture capital and with completing 
product development. This evidence reveals a pattern of founder turnover, but it does not 
address the assumption that most entrepreneurs do not transition to the managerial role that 
CEOs of larger firms have to fulfill. 
 
The two main roles of management control systems—reducing agency and 
information processing costs—suggest that these systems play a relevant role in facilitating 
growth. While theoretical arguments are compelling for this relationship, the empirical 
evidence is sparse; mostly because empirical studies that have examined startup firms’ 
growth have looked at variables such as founder characteristics, strategy or competitive 
environment. In contrast, the potential effect of firm size on management control systems 
has been documented for a subset of these systems (HR and accounting). Finally, the 
personal characteristics that lead to unusual CEO turnover in high-growth startups suggests 
that the founders’ inability to structure the organization will be reflected in lower levels of 
management control system adoption. 
 
 
3.  Research design 
 
3.1. Sample description 
 
We used the following criteria to select our sample: 1) between 50 and 150 
employees at sampling date, 2) less than 10 years old, 3) independent, and 4) in a limited 
geographical area. Prior to launching the study, we met five chief financial officers with 
start-up firm experience (all of them with multiple start-ups). This position is typically 
responsible for the development of financial and strategic management systems and 
provides a company-wide perspective. We described the objectives of the study to identify 
which types of startups would be most suitable to address our research question. These 
managers indicated that smaller companies rely on informal mechanisms, and that 
management control systems only become relevant when companies reach a size of 40 to 50 
employees. This pilot feedback led to a minimum size of 50 employees. Our sample 
includes companies with more than 150 employees. Some firms with fewer than 150 
employees at the time of sampling had more in prior periods or at the time of data 
collection. We also set an age limit of 10 years; the objective of this criterion was to sample 
companies that have grown fast. Also, this age limit identified companies more likely to 
have top managers who are familiar with the history of the firm and with the adoption of 
management control systems in particular. We also restricted our sample to independent 




headquarters—and companies within a limited geographical area.
2 We did not require 
companies to be either public or private, foreign owned, or venture funded; however, most 
of the companies in our sample were private, domestically owned, and venture funded. 
 
Our sample includes high technology and non-tech companies. We sourced our 
sample from the CorpTech Internet directory of technology companies. We accessed the 
database in January and June 2002 from the following industries (using CorpTech industry 
classification): biotech (BIO), computer hardware (COM), manufacturing (MAN), medical 
equipment (MED), pharmaceuticals (PHA), photonics (PHO), computer software (SOF), 
subassemblies (SUB), test & measuring equipment (TAM), and telecommunications (TEL) 
and non-tech industries (NON).
3 Within the high technology sector, we purposefully over-
sampled biotechnology companies to collect a large enough sample of companies in an 
increasingly important sector. To collect a large enough sample of biotechnology firms, we 
extended this sub-sample using three additional databases particular to the industry: Rich’s 
high-tech business guide to Silicon Valley and Northern California (2000/2002), BioScan 
(Oct. 2001), and the U.S. Business Browser (2001). We also expanded the geographical 
criterion. We extended our search for venture-backed non-technology companies through 
PWC MoneyTree, accessed in January 2003. 
 
We sent a letter to the CEO of every company in the sampled population, 
describing the purpose of the research, the research process, and the benefits of 
participating. The letter was followed up with a phone call; a company was dropped from 
the sample if it had not accepted or declined participation after five phone calls. Table 1 
documents the sample selection process. The acceptance rate was 19% of the population of 
eligible firms.
4 We compared participating and non-participating companies in terms of size 
and age, both of these variables being available from the databases. We found no significant 
differences between these two populations.
5 The final sample includes 78 start-up 
companies. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on the sample. The sample includes a high 
percentage of information technology (48/78=62%) and venture-backed firms (60/78=77%), 
reflecting the need for significant funding to grow at the fast pace required by the sample 
selection criteria. Panel C in Table 3 gives additional summary statistics for the variables in 
the research. The CEOs have mean work experience of 18 years, with the 25th percentile at 
12 years. Most firms have not yet reached profitability, again reflecting the bias towards 




3.2. Research design 
 
We adopted a multi-method, multi-case field research design. Because data on the 
evolution of management processes is not available from public sources, we developed 
tailored research instruments to gather the data. We used a multi-method design, combining 
archival data from public sources, three questionnaires and semi-structured interviews. 
 
For each company, we collected available information from public sources—such 
as company web pages and press releases from Lexis-Nexis. This information was 
important to familiarize the research team with each company before the actual data 
                                                 
2 The main reason for the geographic criterion was research funding (more than fifty percent of the companies 
were visited on-site).   
3 We excluded from these lists any companies that were also listed as “Energy,” “Environment,” “Chemical,”  
“Defense,” or “Transportation”.   
4 This response rate assumes that all companies that did not respond were eligible.  
5 We compared means and medians of sales, employees, and age of our sample and the sample of companies 




collection. Then we sent three questionnaires to each firm, addressed to the CEO, CFO/ 
financial manager and the business development/ marketing manager. The questionnaire 
captured quantifiable information about the company, including its financial and funding 
history, as well as the dates on which particular management control systems were 
formalized. The information was triangulated in various ways. Financial and funding 
information was compared with information independently collected by Venture One and 
Venture Economics.
6 The dates of adoption of a sub-sample of management control systems 
were asked for in two different questionnaires. In both of these triangulation efforts, the 
kappa statistic of inter-rater agreement was highly significant. Finally, we collected 
additional data through semi-structured interviews with each of the three managers. Each 
interview relied on a detailed protocol with the questions to be addressed. The protocol 
insured that the main topics were systematically covered during the conversation. The semi-
structured nature of the interview gave flexibility to query the interviewer when clarification 
of particular practices was required (Marshall & Rossman, 1995). We conducted the 
interviews in person or by phone and at least two researchers were present in every 
interview. Interviews lasted about an hour and were taped and then transcribed. The 
interview was also instrumental in clarifying and triangulating the answers to the 
questionnaire (Jick, 1979). Rich description of each company’s history gave the context to 
understand why systems were adopted. During the interviews, we did not ask respondents 
directly about “intangible” variables such as company culture, which may vary depending 
on the respondent’s background or may entice respondents to bias their answer to 
“acceptable practices.” Rather, we infer these variables from the actors’ description of their 
experience (Seidman, 1998). Finally, we chose a multi-case field design to gather a large 
enough sample to go beyond company-specific experiences and examine the 
generalizability of the findings through statistical validation.  
 
Interviews and questionnaires have certain limitations. There is no guarantee that 
the data fully reflects reality. Respondents may be subject to recall bias or to their image of 
the history of the company. We mitigate this limitation by asking several respondents about 
various dimensions of the variables of interest, and by inquiring mainly about their 
experiences while minimizing their personal assessments. We also compare their responses 
with public sources of data when available. 
 
 
3.3. Research variables: Management control system intensity 
 
Our main variable of interest is management control systems adoption. We asked 
respondents about the date of adoption of eight categories of systems: 1) human resource 
planning, 2) strategic planning, 3) financial planning, 4) human resource evaluation, 5) 
financial evaluation, 6) product development management, 7) sales management, and 8) 
partnership management. These categories map the most relevant organizational functions. 
Table 3 lists the systems included in each category. It is not intended to be an exhaustive list 
but captures the main systems in each category. To further examine the adequacy of these 
eight groups we ran an exploratory factor analysis with varimax rotation on the time-to-
adoption of the 46 systems; the various systems loaded into factors that closely mapped onto 
the categories defined. 
 
Using the adoption date, we classified each company-year since funding as having 
or not having a particular system.
7 Founding date was obtained from the CFO questionnaire 
and checked against the date reported in Venture One. In all cases but one, the dates were 
comparable. In that one case, we cross-checked the information with the CFO and used his 
                                                 
6 Both firms are public data sources that collect funding information for startup companies.  In some cases, 
they also report financial statement information.  




reported date. For each of the eight categories and for each company-year, we estimated the 
category intensity or level of system adoption as the percentage of systems adopted. Finally, 




Table 4 provides descriptive statistics on the eight categories of systems. Panel A 
presents the time-to-adopting half of the median number of systems within each category 
and the percentage of companies that reached this benchmark. As expected, planning 
systems are adopted faster,
9 while the adoption of sales and partnership systems is slower. 
For each firm, we also ranked the eight categories from fastest to be adopted (1) to slowest 
(8). Panel B reports the average ranking for each category. We examined these same 
descriptive statistics using time-to-adoption of the second most popular system within each 
category. The pattern was similar to the one reported in Table 4. 
 
Figure 1, Panel A plots intensity for each of the eight categories since the 
companies’ founding. Financial planning system intensity is highest throughout the initial 
stages of a company’s life. Sales and partnership management intensities are lowest during 
that initial period. Figure 1, Panel B plots intensity over four company size portfolios. The 
patterns are similar, with financial planning at the top and sales and partnership systems at 
the bottom. Figure 2 describes variability in management control system intensity across the 
sample. Panel A plots the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of our measure of system 
intensity over the first seven years of a company; Panel B does the same for the four size 
portfolios. The pattern is similar to Figure 1, with intensity growing over time and with size, 
and with significant variability in intensity across firms in the sample.  
 
 
3.4. Additional research variables 
 
To examine the relevance of management control systems to the early stages of 
high-growth firms, we collected information on number of employees over time, company 
valuation, and CEO rotation. We asked CFOs in each company to detail the number of 
employees at the end of each year since founding. We also asked them to provide a financial 
history of the company, giving the dates of funds inflows—in most cases, venture capital 
investments—the amounts invested, and company valuation. This information was 
contrasted with Venture One and Venture Economics data. In most cases, both sources 
provided the same information; when in conflict, we reconfirmed the data with the CFO. To 
control for the valuation environment, we adjusted company valuation by the NASDAQ 
index. We collected the CEO history from the CEO questionnaire, where we asked for the 
dates on which a new person was appointed CEO and this person’s years of experience. We 
checked this information during the CEO and business development manager interviews. 
 








                                                 
8 We standardized each type of system to equally-weight the eight different types of systems in our overall 
measure of system intensity.   
9 This finding is consistent with traditional control systems theory, where planning comes first, followed by 




4. Empirical results 
 
4.1. Management control systems and company growth 
 
Management control systems have been said to facilitate growth. For instance, 
Greiner (1972, 1998) identifies the first crisis in the evolution of a firm as a “crisis of 
leadership”, where a new leader downplays creativity to provide direction to the company. 
Management control systems are adopted to overcome the limitations of informal 
management styles that require constant personal interaction. They provide the management 
infrastructure to scale up the business model. Or as a manager in our sample put it, “We had 
management by personality and it became evident that that wouldn’t scale. We figured our 
personalities can go through one floor and two walls. After that, management by personality 
doesn’t work anymore.” 
 
Figure 3 provides initial evidence on the predicted relationship between company 
size and management control system intensity. It plots the average firm size over time for 
three portfolios. Portfolio (1) is formed with the companies in the lowest third in terms of 
system intensity in year two. Portfolio (2) is formed with the next third of companies. And 
portfolio (3) is formed with the third of companies with highest intensity in year two. The 
plot suggests an association between intensity in year two and company size over time. 
Means and median tests between the various portfolios are significant from year two 
onwards. Similar results are obtained if the portfolios are formed in year one or three. 
 
However, management control systems themselves are endogenous to company 
size. Small companies do not need these systems, and empirical evidence has found strong 
evidence for company size being associated with the adoption of these management systems 
(Baron, Burton, & Hannan, 1996; Dávila, 2005). 
 
We model the endogeneity of our two research variables using a simultaneous 
equation model. The first equation uses number of employees as a proxy for company size. 
The second equation uses management control system intensity as a measure of rate of 
adoption. To ensure identification of the system of equations, both equations require 
additional variables. In addition to management control system intensity, we include in the 
first equation two additional variables—revenues and cumulative funding—which arguably 
affect company growth. In equilibrium, companies will hire the number of employees 
required to satisfy demand for their products. We use revenues to proxy demand in the 
company’s product market. In addition to external demand, growth may come from the need 
to develop technology, products, and markets. We proxy this internal demand for growth 
with the cumulative funding that a company has received. 
 
In addition to number of employees, our second equation includes the following 
variables. Venture capitalists have been said to professionalize their firms faster (Hellmann 
et al., 2002). We include a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for company-years in 
which the company has venture capital investors. CEOs with more experience are more 
likely to have been exposed to management control systems and, therefore, to be 
knowledgeable about their benefits and costs. If, on average, the adoption of these systems 
trails company needs, then we would expect CEO experience to accelerate their adoption. 
This variable is a time-varying variable that changes each time the CEO is replaced and as 
time progresses. We also include a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the original 
CEO has been replaced. Entrepreneurs often have a hard time transitioning into a manager’s 
mindset (Willard et al., 1992). Management control systems are tools that managers rely on 
but entrepreneurs perceive as killing the entrepreneurial spirit. Therefore, we expect this 
variable to have a positive effect. We also include a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 




require fewer systems. Table 5 provides relevant quotes from the research interviews that 
illustrate the potential relevance of these variables to explain management control system 
intensity. Finally, we control for companies in information technology, which is the largest 
group in our sample. 
 
Table 6 reports Pearson and Spearman correlations. Variables are positively and 
significantly correlated. In particular, management control system intensity and number of 
employees are highly associated. The pattern of both types of correlations is similar, 
indicating that Pearson correlations are not driven by extreme observations. 
 
We examined the model for the possibility of auto-correlated error terms. We 
found this to be a problem in equation two, and model the error term using a first order auto-
correlation model. In addition to the information technology industry, we further control 
company attributes using a random-effects model. We run a Hausman test comparing the 
more efficient random-effects model with a fixed-effect model and did not reject the 
equality of coefficients. 
 
Our final specification is: 
 
Employees = α0 + α1 intensity + α2 revenues + α3 ln (cumulative funding) + ε 
Intensity = β0 + β1 employees + β2 VC-backed + β3 CEO exp. + β4 founder  
replaced    + β5 post-revenue + β6 IT industry + ε(AR1) 
 
Table 7 provides the results using an iterative estimation approach. The coefficient 
on management control system intensity (α1) is positively associated with employee growth. 
This is consistent with the predicted relevance of these systems to the growth of startup 
firms. Revenues (α2) and cumulative funding (α3) are also positive and significant. These 
findings are consistent with external demand and the availability of resources to meet 
internal needs for employees being associated with company growth.  
 
In the second equation, the number of employees (β1) is significantly associated 
with management system intensity. This finding is consistent with predictions and with 
previous empirical evidence that identified size as a relevant variable to explain 
management system adoption. The coefficient on the presence of venture capital (β2) is 
positive and significant, consistent with this type of capital bringing “professional” systems 
to companies. The founder’s replacement as CEO (β4) is marginally associated with system 
intensity. Also, companies beyond the pre-revenue stage (β5) are positively associated with 
the intensity of management control systems.  
 
In summary, the findings are consistent with company growth and management 
control systems being interrelated. These systems are needed to provide the management 
infrastructure to support growth beyond the informal stage; simultaneously, they are needed 
only if the company is growing.  
 
 
4.2. CEO rotation and management control systems 
 
The replacement of entrepreneurs in the CEO position has been frequently 
associated with these people being unable to transition into a manager’s mindset (Willard et 
al., 1992). A powerful indicator of this transition is the adoption of management control 
systems. Figure 4 provides descriptive evidence relevant to this question. For each one of 
the first three years of the life of a firm, we independently classified firms into three groups 




first year of existence according to intensity, then again in their second year, and again in 
their third year. For each group in each year we estimated the proportion of founders that 
were replaced during the years for which we have data. Figure 4 suggests an association 
between management control system intensity and the founder’s replacement as CEO.  
 
Table 8 examines this same question in a multivariate setting. We examine two 
different models. The dependent variable in the first model is the time from founding to the 
replacement of the founder as CEO. The dependent variable in the second one is the time to 
replacement of a CEO from his or her hiring date, regardless of whether the CEO was a 
member of the founding team. The second model takes advantage of the additional 
information in the database about CEO tenure beyond the founding CEO. We use a hazard 
model to reflect the survival series structure of the dependent variable (Allison, 1995). The 
hazard function characterizes survival models and can be thought of as the conditional 
probability of a particular event happening (CEO replacement) in an interval (t, t+∆), given 
that it has not happened at time t.
10 The hazard function is modeled as: 
 
h(t, X(t)) = h(t, 0) exp[(β’ X(t)] 
 
Where h(t, X(t)) is the hazard rate at time t and X(t) are the explanatory variables 
that can vary over time. To impose the least structure in our statistical specification we use a 
Cox proportional hazard model with right censoring and time-varying covariates. In contrast 
to parametric models, the Cox is a semi-parametric model and does not require estimates of 
the baseline hazard function (h(t, 0)), which is assumed to be common across companies. 
Covariates affect the proportion of a company’s hazard function relative to any other 
company’s hazard.  
 
If intensity is associated with an entrepreneur (or CEO in the expanded model) 
being able to transition into a managerial role, then we expect intensity to be associated with 
longer tenure. In addition, we control for number of employees, industry, CEO experience, 
and whether the firm is venture-backed.  
 
Table 8 reports the hazard ratios. A coefficient of one indicates that the variable has 
no influence on the time to the event, while a coefficient of less (more) than one indicates 
that the variable is associated with a longer (shorter) time to the event.  
 
Intensity is significant and associated with longer tenure in both models in Table 8. 
The coefficient for information technology is larger than one and significant, indicating that 
tenure in this industry is shorter. Size of the firm is significant and greater than one in the 
second model but not in the first. This result is consistent with shorter tenures in larger 
firms. CEO experience is also larger than one and significant in model one (but non-
significant in model two). This result indicates that founders with more experience are 
replaced sooner. It appears that founders with less experience (younger) can better transition 
from their original background into general management. Alternatively, these younger 
founders may be more reluctant to leave the CEO position than more experienced managers. 
While our data does not include further information on CEOs that are not in office other 
than their years of experience, our interview data includes detailed background information 
on the current CEO. To shed some initial light on this result, we examined the impact of 
current CEO characteristics on CEO transition. In particular, we found that in companies in 
which the current CEO has extensive company background or has been CEO previously, the 
founder had shorter tenure. How we interpret this evidence depends on the correlation we 
expect to find between the current CEO’s background and the founder’s background. If we 
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expect the new CEO to have a different background, we can infer that the founder had no 
prior general management experience and less exposure to management control systems. 




4.3. Company valuation and management control system intensity 
 
Previous evidence supports the relevance of management control systems to the 
growth of the firm and CEO tenure. A further test of their relevance is to examine whether 
they appear to be valued. In contrast to public companies, private companies are not valued 
continuously, but only at funding events—typically when the company obtains new venture 
capital investment to fund its growth. This fact limits the number of observations available. 
However, venture capitalists investing in a firm have much more access to company 
information than public markets have. Venture capitalists are in close contact with the top 
management team and value the market opportunities open to the firm as much as how the 
company is managed. Thus, they are more likely to have information about and value 
management control systems.  
 
The observed relationship between company size and management control systems 
and the evidence from Table 7 suggest that such systems are needed for managing larger 
firms. Thus, system intensity is not valuable at any size but only as companies grow. We 
model this interdependence using an interaction variable of number of employees with 
system intensity.  
 
The specification is: 
 
Valuation = α0 + α1 employees + α2 intensity + α3 employees * intensity + Σ αi  
other covariates + ε 
 
Table 9 presents the results using a rank regression. Prior studies examining the 
valuation of pre-IPO companies have adopted this specification (Armstrong, Dávila, & 
Foster, 2005). This type of regression has been shown to perform well when the dependent 
variable is a non-linear, monotonic function of the independent variables. Company 
valuation of pre-IPO firms is likely to have this functional relationship. Indeed, Sahlman 
(1993) argues that venture capital investments have three option components—the option to 
abandon, the option to revalue, and the option to increase investment—which are likely to 
introduce nonlinearities. Moreover, rank regression is preferred to alternative robust 
regression techniques such as winsorizing extreme observations because it gives equal 
weight to extreme observations (Iman & Conover, 1979) and treats them as valid data 
points, rather than as “outliers.” We examine this model in the sub-sample of venture-
backed firms (for which we have valuation information) prior to IPO.  
 
The interaction term in Table 9 is positive and significant, indicating that higher 
company valuation is associated with firms that adopt management control systems as they 
grow. In addition, number of employees is also significant, consistent with larger firms 
having higher valuation. The coefficient for income is negative. This is consistent with firms 
in this sub-sample being in an early stage of their life cycle, with high R&D investments, 
low revenues, and periodic funding rounds. Consistent with this observation, Armstrong et 
al. (2005), in a sample of venture-backed pre-IPO firms, find R&D investments are between 
35% and 70% of income and have a positive valuation. The coefficient on revenue is 
negative, in contrast with prior evidence (Armstrong et al., 2005). However, our model 




controlling for employees. This observation is consistent with companies with higher 
revenues having lower growth prospects, conditional on their being the same size. That is, 
companies with lower revenues have more employees devoted to pre-revenue activities such 
as R&D that receive higher multiples than revenues (Armstrong et al., 2005). 
 
 
4.4. Management control system complementarities 
 
In this sub-section we address the question of what variables are associated with 
time-to-adoption of management control systems. Prior literature has identified 
organizational size, founder replacement as CEO, and the presence of venture capital in the 
equity of the firm as associated with the adoption of human resource management systems 
(Dávila, 2005). We extend this line of inquiry to management control systems beyond 
human resource systems to the three types of planning systems identified in our database—
human resources, strategic, and financial. Panel A, Table 4 identifies them as being the 
earliest ones adopted. Furthermore, these three types of systems capture the most interesting 
aspects of system complementarities; human resources and financial evaluation systems are 
closely associated with firms having adopted the corresponding planning systems; product 
development, sales, and partnership systems depend on the particular needs of the function 
and are unlikely to be associated with the adoption of other types of systems. We focus on 
these three types of systems to further examine whether having adopted a particular type of 
system is associated with faster (or slower) adoption of alternative systems. A positive 
(negative) association—that is, faster (slower) adoption—is consistent with these types of 
systems being complements (supplements).  
 
There is little in terms of theory to guide our priors; therefore, the results should be 
interpreted as exploratory. If the demand for one type of system (human resource planning, 
for instance) influences the demand for another (strategic planning), then we expect the 
presence of the former to accelerate adoption of the latter. The systems behave as 
complements. Conversely, if the adoption of one type of system provides enough structure 
to facilitate company growth without the need to adopt other types, then the presence of the 
one will delay adoption of the others. These systems behave as supplements.  
 
The dependent variables are the time-to-adoption of half of the median number of 
systems adopted within each type of system. We chose half of the median number of 
systems as a reasonable benchmark to have enough variance in the dependent variable and 
to capture the relevance of each type of systems to the management of the firm.
11 The 
explanatory variables are the same ones as were used in the system intensity equation in 
Table 7. These variables are included following the same arguments as in Table 7. In 
addition, we code whether a company has adopted a particular type of system using a time-
varying dummy variable. This variable takes the value of 0 for years in which the company 
has not adopted half of the median systems within the type, and the value of 1 if it has 
reached the benchmark. This variable captures the potential role of alternative systems as 
complements or supplements.  
 
The three models are: 
 
Time-to-adoption of HR planning systems = f(control variables, presence/absence 
of strategic planning systems, presence/absence of financial planning systems) 
 
                                                 
11 We run the tests using the time-to-adoption of the second most popular system within each type. We chose 
the second most popular rather than the most popular to avoid picking up idiosyncrasies of individual systems.  




Time-to-adoption of strategic planning systems = f(control variables, presence/ 
/absence of HR planning systems, presence/absence of financial planning systems) 
 
Time-to-adoption of financial planning systems=f(control variables, presence/absence 
of strategic planning systems, presence/absence of HR planning systems) 
 
Table 10 reports the results. For each of the three planning systems, we run two 
separate models. The first includes the variables from Table 7, which were said to affect 
system adoption. The second one includes whether a company has adopted the other two 
types of systems as additional explanatory variables.  
 
Given the survival nature of the data, we again use a Cox specification model and 
report hazard ratios. To model the endogeneity of the adoption of the three types of 
management systems, we run a first stage logit regression for each type of system, where the 
independent variable is the dummy variable for whether a particular type of system has been 
adopted and the independent variables are the exogenous variables from Table 7. For 
financial systems we also include whether the company has hired a financial manager, 
which during the interviews appeared to be an important determinant of these systems. For 
HR and strategic systems we include whether the company has international operations, 
which arguably increases the need for planning. We use the residuals from this first stage 
model—that is, the variance unexplained by the exogenous variables—as independent 
variables in the second stage.  
 
The results from the model without the alternative systems’ explanatory variables 
are broadly consistent with prior results. The presence of venture capital is associated with 
faster adoption; size is also associated with faster adoption, except for financial systems; 
CEO experience is associated with faster adoption of financial systems but slower adoption 
of HR systems. While experienced CEOs appear to quickly embrace financial systems, they 
take longer to do the same with HR.  
 
When including the presence/absence of alternative planning systems, we find that 
the adoption of financial systems is associated with slower adoption of HR and strategic 
systems. We also find that HR and strategic planning systems behave as complements, the 





An informal approach to managing organizations becomes harder when they grow 
beyond a certain size. At that point, the adoption of management control systems becomes 
important to provide the management infrastructure required to scale up the organization. 
Modeling this transition point as a system of simultaneous equations, we find that 
management control systems adoption is positively associated with firm size and, 
simultaneously, firm size is associated with the presence of such systems. This evidence 
indicates that growth and the adoption of management systems reinforce each other as firms 
transition through their first “growth crisis.” We also find evidence regarding the empirical 
regularity found in startup firms, where founders are replaced as CEOs more often than 
expected. We find that CEOs with lower adoption of management control systems are more 
likely to be replaced. Furthermore, venture capital investors appear to price the adoption of 
management control systems in larger startup firms. Overall, the evidence supports the 
relevance of these systems to the growth of startup firms beyond their initial stage. Finally, 
we find that HR systems are adopted more slowly in startups that already have financial 
planning systems. 




The evidence adds to our understanding of an important phase in the life of firms—
their transition from informal to professional management. The research was designed to 
minimize the threats to validity of field research by using multiple informants, multiple 
sources of data and data triangulation. However, the data is still subject to biases associated 
with recreating the history of the firm. In addition, the research design is limited to the 
existence of omitted variables. In particular, we do not have detailed information on CEOs 
that have been replaced and thus we cannot characterize them beyond their years of 
experience. These managers’ functional background and prior experience in startup and 
mature firms may be relevant variables to explain why they appear to adopt management 
systems at a slower pace.  
 
The evidence in this paper can be extended in several dimensions. We treat systems 
in a dichotomous way—either the company has adopted or has not adopted them. While this 
characterization is appropriate, it fails to capture the potential variance in the quality of 
systems. During the data collection period it was not unusual to find anecdotal evidence 
where a company had over-invested in software for financial systems that put too much 
burden on the firm once its growth prospects did not materialize. It was also common to 
have descriptions of these systems evolving from fairly straightforward systems to more 
sophisticated ones. We also look at an overall measure of system adoption, but do not model 
each particular type of system. It is likely that each type of system, from HR to partnerships 
systems, has its own pattern of adoption. For instance, it was common during the interviews 
to have descriptions of adoption associated with the hiring of a particular manager—the idea 
of “importing” knowledge. Finally, we do not model the interaction between strategy, 
growth and management control systems; while strategy may have only a minor role in the 
overall pattern of adoption, it may play a significant role in the sequence in which different 






Allison, P. 1995. Survival analysis using the SAS system: A practical guide. Cary, NC: SAS 
Institute. 
 
Anthony, R. N. 1965. The management control function. Boston, MA: Harvard Business 
School Press. 
 
Armstrong, C., Dávila, A., & Foster, G. 2005. Venture-backed private equity valuation and 
financial statement information. Working paper, Graduate School of Business, 
Stanford University. 
 
Ashby, W. R. 1960. Design for a Brain, the Origin of Adaptive Behavior. New York, NY: 
Wiley. 
 
Baiman, S. 1982. Agency research in management accounting: a survey. Journal of 
Accounting Literature (Spring): 154-213. 
 
Baron, J. N., Burton, D. M., & Hannan, M. T. 1996. The road taken: origins and evolution 
of employment systems in emerging companies. Industrial and Corporate Change, 5: 
239-275. 
 
Baron, J. N., Hannan, M. T., & Burton, M. D. 2001. Labor Pains: Change in Organizational 
Models and Employee Turnover in Young, High-Tech Firms. American Journal of 
Sociology, (106): 960. 
 
Barringer, B. R., Jones, F. F., & Neubaum, D. O. 2005. A quantitative content analysis of 
the characteristics of rapid-growth firms and their founders. Journal of Business 
Venturing, 20: 663-687. 
 
Cardinal, L. 2001. Technological innovation in the pharmaceutical industry: The use of 
organizational control in managing research and development. Organization Science, 
12(1): 19-36. 
 
Chenhall, R. H. 2003. Management control systems design within its organizational context: 
findings from contingency-based research and directions for the future. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, 28: 127-168. 
 
Dávila, T. 2005. An exploratory study on the emergence of management control systems: 
Formalizing human resources in small growing firms. Accounting, Organizations and 
Society, 30(3): 223-248. 
 
Dávila, A. & Foster G. 2005. Management accounting systems adoption decisions: 
Evidence and performance implications from startup companies. Working paper, 
Stanford University. 
 
Fiet, J. O. & Busenitz, L. W. 1997. Complementary theoretical perspectives on the dismissal 
of new venture team members. Journal of Business Venturing, Vol. 12: 347. 
 
Greiner, L. E. 1972. Evolution and revolution as organizations grow. Harvard Business 
Review: 37-46. 
 
Greiner, L. E. 1998. Evolution and revolution as organizations grow. Harvard Business 




Hellmann, T. & Puri, M. 2002. Venture capital and the professionalization of start-up firms: 
Empirical evidence. Journal of Finance, 57(1): 169-198. 
 
Iman, R. L. & Conover, W. J. 1979. The use of rank transform in regression. Technometrics, 
21: 499-509. 
 
Jick, T. D. 1979. Mixing qualitative and quantitative methods: Triangulation in action. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 24: 602-611. 
 
Marshall, C. & Rossman, G. B. 1995. Designing Qualitative Research. Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage Publications Inc. 
 
Moores, K. & Yuen, S. 2001. Management accounting systems and organizational 
configuration: A life-cycle perspective. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 26: 
351-389. 
 
Narayanan, V. G. & Dávila, A. 1998. Using delegation and control systems to mitigate the 
trade-off between the performance-evaluation and belief-revision use of accounting 
signals. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 25(3): 255-282. 
 
Nelson, R. R. & Winter, S. G. 1982. An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Reid, G. C. & Smith, J. A. 2000. What Makes a New Business Start-Up Successful? Small 
Business Economics, (14): 165. 
 
Roure, J. B. & Keeley, R. H. 1990. Management, strategy, and industry structure as 
influences on the success of new firms: A structural model. Management Science, 
(36): 1256. 
 
Rubenson, G. C. & Gupta, A. K. 1996. The Initial Succession: A Contingency Model of 
Founder Tenure. Entrepreneurship: Theory & Practice, (21): 21-35. 
 
Sahlman, W. A. 1993. Aspects of financial contracting in venture capital. The new 
corporate finance: Where theory meets practice: 229-242. New York, NY: McGraw 
Hill. 
 
Sandino, T. 2005. Introducing the first management control systems: Evidence from the 
retail sector. Working paper, University of Southern California. 
 
Seidman, I. 1998. Interviewing as Qualitative Research: A Guide for Researchers in 
Education and the Social Sciences. New York: Teachers College Press. 
 
Siegel, R., Siegel, E., & MacMillan, I. C. 1993. Characteristics Distinguishing High-Growth 
Ventures. Journal of Business Venturing, (8): 169. 
 
Simons, R. 1995. Control in an age of empowerment. Harvard Business Review, 73(2): 80-
89. 
 
Wasserman, N. 2003. Founder-CEO Succession and the Paradox of Entrepreneurial 





Willard, G. E. & Krueger, D. A. 1992. In order to grow, must the founder go: a comparison 
of performance between founder and non-founder managed high-growth 
manufacturing firms. Journal of Business Venturing, 7: 181-195. 
 
Zollo, M. & Winter, S. G. 2002. Deliberate Learning and the Evolution of Dynamic 






Adoption of management control systems 
 













































The figure in Panel A (Panel B) plots the evolution of average management control system intensity 
for each of the eight types of systems examined over time (by portfolio size of equal number of observations). 
Intensity is defined as the sum of systems within each group adopted in a particular year since the founding of 
the firm (Panel A) or in a particular portfolio size (Panel B), divided by the total number of systems within 
each group. The y-axis is the average intensity for the firms in the sample. The x-axis is years since founding 
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Variation in management control system intensity across firms 
 












































The figure in Panel A (Panel B) plots the 0.25, 0.50, and 0.75 percentiles of management control 
systems’ average intensity over time (by portfolio size of equal number of observations). Intensity is the 
overall measure of management control systems intensity, defined as the sum standardized intensities for each 
one of the eight types of systems examined. Intensity within a group is the sum of systems within each group 
adopted in a particular year since the founding of the firm (Panel A) or in a particular portfolio size (Panel B), 
divided by the total number of systems within each group. The y-axis is the average intensity for the firms in 





































































This figure plots average company size over time for three portfolios. Each company in the sample 
is assigned to one of the portfolios according to its system intensity in its second year of existence. Each 
portfolio has an equal number of firms. Portfolio (1) is formed with the 33% of companies with lowest 
intensity, portfolio (3) is formed with the 33% of companies with highest intensity, and portfolio (2) is made 



















































This figure plots the percentage of founder CEOs replaced per level of management control system 
intensity. Firms were grouped into three portfolios, from lowest to highest intensity, in each of the first three 
years. The y axis is the percentage of founders replaced and the X-axis are the three portfolios from highest 



















1 These are companies that are too small, too old, or subsidiaries of other companies. 






























































Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
     
  Companies in the initial database    624   
Minus     
  Companies that went out of business    94   
 Companies  acquired   88   
  Companies ineligible in some other way
1   41   
  Companies that did not respond
2   188   
  Companies that declined participation    135   






Descriptive statistics on sample of companies 
 
 








































1 Estimated for all CEOs in the sample. 
2 Employees is calculated at the peak of each company’s size.  
3 Revenues and profits are for the last year of data available. 
4 Valuation statistics are for the largest valuation round available.  
 
 Mean  Std.  Dev.  Q1  Median  Q3 
Number of CEOs   1.65    0.78    1    1   2 
Years of total experience of CEO
1    18.42   8.48   12    20    25 
Age of the company   5.47    2.44    3    5   7 
Number of employees
2   118    62    71    113  155 
Revenues (’000)
3    10,923  11,853    2,437    7,300  15,000 
Income (’000)
3    -9,455  15,668    -12,469    -4,700   29 
Number of VC rounds   3.43    1.78    2    3   5 
Valuation (millions)
4   168.600   229.6    21.5   67.25   192.7 
 
Industry  Number of companies 
Biotechnology 12 
Information technology  48 
Other industries
1  18 
Total
  78 
 
Financing type  Number of companies 
Venture capital financed
  60 
Other forms of financing  18 
Total



















































For each system, we asked respondents for the date when the system was adopted. The instructions 
were: “For each system below, please indicate when your company formalized it; “formalized” means having 
documented a process and/or periodically and purposefully executing the process.” 
 
Financial planning  Cash flow projections 
Sales projections 
Operating budget 
Human resource planning  Organizational chart 
Written job descriptions 
Codes of conduct 
Mission statement 
Core values 





Definition of strategic (non-financial) milestones 
Product portfolio plan (plan about future products) 
Customer development plan (plan to develop market) 
Headcount/human capital development plan 
Financial evaluation  Product profitability analysis 
Customer profitability analysis 
Customer acquisition costs 
Routine analysis of financial performance against target 
Capital investment approval procedures 
Operating expenses approval procedures 
Human resource evaluation  Written performance objectives for managers 
Written performance evaluation reports 
Performance-related pay 
Individual incentive programs 
Product development management  Project milestones 
Budget for development projects 
Reports comparing actual progress to plan 
Project selection process 
Product portfolio roadmap 
Project team composition guidelines 
Product concept testing process 
Sales management  Sales force training program 
Sales force hiring and firing policies 
Sales targets for salespeople 
Sales force compensation system 
Marketing collaboration policies 
Market research projects 
Reports on open sales 
Sales process manual 
Customer satisfaction feedback 
Customer relationship management system 
Partnership management 
 
Partnership development plan 
Policy for partnerships 
Partnership milestones 






Descriptive statistics on management control systems 
 

















Time to adoption is the average across companies in the sample of the time to adopting half of the 
median number of systems adopted within each category of management control systems (in years). The 
median is estimated using those firms that report the adoption of at least one system within each category. 
Percentage of companies is the percentage of companies that have adopted half of the median number of 
systems by the end of the observation period. Percentage of companies for product development systems is 




















For each firm and each type of system, we estimate when half of the median of systems adopted is 
reached. We then rank these milestones for each firm. The table reports the descriptive statistics. 
 
  Time to adoption   
 Mean  Q1  Median  Q3  Percentage  of 
companies 
Financial  planning  2.36  1 2 3  87.2 
Strategic  planning  2.45  1 2 4  76.9 
Human  resource  planning  2.58  1 2 4  80.8 
Financial  evaluation  2.75  1 2 4  85.9 
Human  resource  evaluation  2.80  1 2 4  78.2 
Product  development  3.06  1 3 5  78.0 
Sales  management  3.20  2 3 5  69.2 
Partnership  management  3.38  2 3 5  47.4 
 
  Ranking of adoption 
 Mean  Q1  Median  Q3 
Financial planning  1.82  1  1,0  2,0 
Strategic planning  2.03  1  1,0  3,0 
Human resource planning  2.59  1  2,0  3,0 
Financial evaluation  2.62  1  2,0  4,0 
Human resource evaluation  2.52  1  2,0  3,0 
Product development  3.13  1  3,0  5,0 
Sales management  4.14  3  4,0  5.5 



























































Variable Illustrative  quotes 
Number of 
employees 
“And frankly, balance the need to be flexible with the need for getting the right kind of processes 
in place. So on the one hand, you can’t have chaos, but having 110 people in a company and 
having like IBM-type policies and procedures doesn’t make any sense either. So it’s eternally a 
struggle, but I think that the companies that probably succeed in developing, have an instinct for 
when to implement things and what not to. And I think that we’ve probably done reasonably well, 
though certainly some things we’re probably overdue.” 
 
“I think the systems are more important in the scaling period because what works for 20 people 
won’t work for 50 or 200 people, in terms of communication, decision making, etc. So you need 
the systems to formalize and structure it more.” 
 
“It definitely happened to us, when you couldn’t fit everyone into one space and the dynamic 
shifts and communication gets a lot harder.” 
Venture-
backed 
“We manage by the numbers in a lot of ways. Everything we do is numbers focused. So, in order 
to manage by the numbers, you need to have formal reporting structures in place, obviously. The 
marketing planning process is more formal, because that’s what the board requires—you’re going 
to spend this money, we want to know what you’re spending it on and why you’re spending it on 
that. 
 
“(These systems) were put in through a combination of the then Chief Financial Officer as well as 
the minimum expectations set by the VCs. So the board itself had a very strong hand in terms of 
what minimum it was prepared to accept.” 
 
“I just find that you can’t get hurt by over reporting to the board. And reporting early.” 
Managers’ 
experience 
“I think some of it is just something that I’ve learned or I’ve developed over the years from 
experience, things that work.”  
 
“He came from McKinsey and he was a very process oriented guy. So that’s when the process 
began, I would say.”  
 
“A lot of small companies don’t have budgets till very far along, but it’s just unthinkable not to 
have them from my point of view, so that’s probably just one that I brought. Let’s have budgets, 
let’s get more formal about tracking capital expenditures.”  
 
“Some systems expertise you import when you import the right people.” 
Founder 
replaced 
“Originally, the sales organization was run by one of our founders, who was a very, very young 
guy, like 22 at the time or something. But that wasn’t, he just didn’t have a lot of experience 
running this type of organization and putting this kind of systems in place. And then eventually 
we ended up having an experienced VP of sales and marketing join, who then implemented kind 




“So there is a clear need for a formalized policy on communicating with each other. And also 
because we are getting closer to commercialization, there is a need to have a better understanding 
of our cost structure, which needs a very formalized approach.” 
 
“There’s no need to do a product profitability report because we’re not shipping product.”  
 
“So part of where I said I think one of our biggest weaknesses was lack of marketing information 


















The upper triangle reports Pearson correlation and the lower triangle reports Spearman correlation. 
*, **, *** indicates significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
 













System intensity  0.44 






***   0.15 
*** 0.11 
* 
Ln(cum. Funding)  0.55 
*** 0.47 
*** 0.19 
***   0.23 
*** 
CEO experience  0.15 
** 0.16 







































The table reports iterative, random effects simultaneous equations model estimation. z-stat in 
parenthesis. *, **, ***, indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. Employees is the number of employees 
at the end of each year. Intensity is the sum of the standardized percentage of systems adopted within each type 
of management control system. Venture backed takes the value of 1 for those company-years in which the 
company had venture capital in its equity and 0 otherwise. CEO experience is the CEO’s years of experience 
when (s)he became CEO. CEO replaced is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for company-years in 
which the CEO is not the founding CEO. Time to revenue is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for 
company-years beyond the pre-revenue stage. Information technology is a dummy variable that takes the value 
of 1 for firms in the IT sector.  
 
   
Equation 1: Employees 
Constant   -94.88 
** 
 (-2.49) 
Intensity   27.70 
** 
 (2.35) 
Revenues   0.002 
*** 
 (5.47) 
Ln(cumulative funding)    66.56 
*** 
 (3.69) 
Chi-sq.   183.01 
*** 
Overall R
2   0.34 
Equation 2: Intensity  
Constant       -0.93 
*** 
 (-3.40) 
Employees     0.007 
*** 
 (4.27) 
Venture backed     0.242 
* 
 (1.65) 
CEO experience     0.002
 
 (0.18) 
CEO replaced     0.178 
 (1.42) 
Time to revenue     0.314 
** 
 (2.33) 
Information technology     0.365 
* 
 (1.80) 
Chi-sq.   55.02 
*** 






















The table presents a Cox regression model with right censoring and time-varying covariates of CEO 
tenure. A coefficient of one indicates that the variable has no influence on the time to the event; a coefficient 
of less (more) than one indicates that the variable is associated with a longer (shorter) time to the event. * and 
** indicate significant at the 10% and 5% level respectively. MCS intensity is the sum of the standardized 
percentage of systems adopted within each type of management control system. Number of employees is the 
number of employees at the end of each year. Venture backed takes the value of 1 for those company-years in 
which the company had venture capital in its equity and 0 otherwise. CEO experience is the CEO’s years of 
experience when (s)he became CEO. Information technology industry is a dummy variable that takes the value 






















The table reports a rank regression specification with robust standard errors. *** indicates 
significance at 1%. Intensity is the sum of the standardized percentage of systems adopted within each type of 
management control system. Age  is the age of the firm at the time of the valuation round. Information 
technology is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for firms in the IT sector. Income is the profit for the 
most recent year for which profit information is available. Revenues is the revenue for the most recent year for 
which revenue information is available.  
 
  Time to replacing founder as 
CEO 
Time to CEO replacement 
 Hazard  ratio  z-statistic  Hazard  ratio  z-statistic 
MCS intensity  0.537 
**   -
2.10 
0.385 
**  -2.57 
Information technology industry  2.271 
*  1.73 3.514 
** 2.23 
Number of employees  1.004  1.18  1.010 
** 2.39 
CEO experience  1.071 
**  2.29 0.996  -0.15 
Venture backed  2.386  1.35  1.686  0.34 
Number of observations     201       272   
Number of subjects       52         80   
Chi sq.   21.26    10.50   
 
 Company  valuation 
 Coefficient  Standard error 
Constant   71.20 
*** 28.59 
Employees   0.217 
***  0.06 
Intensity   0.023  0.03 
Employees * Intensity   0.102 
*** 0.04 
Age   2.111  1.64 





Number of observations      101     
Chi-sq.   24.86 
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